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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to evaluate the fine-grained assumption implied in the formula specified by the 
Bank for International Settlements Basel Committee on Banking’s internal-ratings based (IRB) 
approach under Pillar 1 of Basel II: minimum capital requirement. We compared the regulatory 
capital charge under Basel II with true unexpected loss approximated by Monte-Carlo 
simulations. We showed that the fine-grained assumption in IRB formula would cause 
regulatory capital charge to deviate from the true unexpected loss when there is concentration in 
the portfolio. Meanwhile, the IRB approach gives misleading information on the risk 
contribution of added large loans with low probability of default, which could be exploited by 
banks as a means to increase risk concentrations while holding lower regulatory capital. 
Moreover, as both the Monte-Carlo simulation and IRB formula are Value at Risk (VaR) 
approaches, we set out to discuss the limitation of using VaR as a risk measure by looking at a 
special case where VaR seems to lose credibility. We suggested two alternatives to account for 
this deficiency. 
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1. Background  
1.1. The 1988 Basel Accord 
Back in 1980’s, the so-called “less developed countries” debt crisis struck the financial industry 
and caused international banks to be severely undercapitalized in unregulated territories. Such 
trend was troublesome to banking practitioners and regulators and consequently convinced them 
to establish a standardized banking regulation in a global sense.  
The Bank for International Settlement, composed of central banks of leading developed nations, 
took the initiative to work on this issue. By 1988, the original Basel Accord was organized 
under Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which was set up by the BIS. The accord 
imposed a uniform, risk-weighted minimum capital to asset ratio of 8% on internationally active 
bank across their entire family of subsidiaries (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988), 
also known as Basel I. Under Basel I banks needed to categorize their assets into different asset 
classes. The purpose was to create incentives for banks to load up asset classes with lower risk, 
as they have to set aside additional capital for higher-risk asset classes.  However, by imposing a 
uniform 8% capital charge, Basel I did not differentiate loans of different risk profiles within 
each asset class.  
In the following years, the United States and Japan suffered from the economic downturn and 
credit crunch. In an attempt to comply with Basel’s regulatory requirement, undercapitalized 
banks were forced to slow down lending, which exacerbated the credit crisis further (Peek and 
Rosengreen, 1995).  
Empirically, the 1988 Accord was widely criticized for the over-simplicity in risk capital 
computation and the exclusive focus on commercial banks and credit risk. Furthermore, its “one 
2 
 
size fits all” approach generated unintended incentives for banks to conduct the so called 
“regulatory arbitrage” (Jackson, 1999). It was argued that the uniform risk weights under Basel I 
did not correctly reflect the true internal risk weights across all assets. Thus banks would seek 
arbitrage profit between constant uniformly-set regulatory charge and highly variable internal 
economic risk charge. In addition, banks learned to abuse two major inventions in 1990s, the 
securitization and credit derivatives to move from low risk assets to high risk assets while 
transferring the excess risk to other parties. In summary, 1988 Basel Accord’s implementation 
ended up worsening the internal risk allocation in banks due to its crudely designed mechanism. 
1.2. Basel II 
Being fully aware of the major controversy of Basel I, the Basel Committee started the 
contemplation in 1999 in an attempt to improve the capital adequacy standard such that 
regulatory capital better reflects economic capital. After several years of consultation and 
revision, in 2004, Basel committee proposed a revised framework generally known as Basel II, 
which tackled the gap between two capital charges by allowing banks to use their own risk 
profiles as inputs to calculate the risk capital. The proposal was carried out in the late 1990’s 
through a general guideline and followed by two detailed drafts in response to industrial 
comments (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001).  
The innovations in Basel II consist of the imposition of three Pillars, inclusion of market risk, 
introduction of operational risk and the application of internal ratings based model. Pillar II 
supervisory review process is intended to foster an active dialogue between banks and 
supervisors to ensure that banks are continuously developing a better risk management system 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). Pillar III market discipline requires certain 
banks to disclose detailed risk management practices. Basel Committee aims to create incentives 
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for banks to enhance their risk practices by encouraging market participation. The new standard 
also recognizes a wider range of financial features such as collaterals and guarantees used in risk 
deductions.  
The most important innovation, also the core of Basel II framework is the internal rating based 
computation, generally known as IRB. In deed, the majority of the consultation and research has 
been dedicated to this area (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). Under Basel II, 
banks are given   three options in computing capital for credit risk. 
1.2.1. Standardized Approach 
Smaller banks with less complex forms of lending and simpler internal structure can choose to 
use the “standardized” approach. Like in Basel I, this approach does not require banks to 
provide their own input. The major distinction lies in risk weights being no longer tied to legal 
status as in Basel I but instead dependent on the externally estimated default probability. 
1.2.2. Foundation and Advanced IRB 
The IRB approach is a critical innovation in the regulatory capital treatment of credit risk. It is a 
credit risk model in a form of analytical solutions designed by regulators to meet their prudential 
objectives. It is a challenging task for Basel committee to develop a standardized formula 
applicable to all participating banks without oversimplifying the mathematical process. Thus 
this formula is far from being all inclusive and we will look at the issues later in this paper. 
Under the IRB formula, each bank divides its assets into up to 14 different classes, for thirteen 
of those classes-except equity stock, the IRB formula applies. Then within each asset class, 
banks subdivide it by borrower credit grades of relatively homogenous characteristics. For each 
credit grade, the IRB formula requires banks to generate their own estimates for probability of 
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default (PD), loss given default (LGD), remaining maturity (M) and exposure at default (EAD), 
those inputs can be derived from historical data or specific information about each asset. And 
then these internal bank estimates are converted into a capital charge for each asset through the 
IRB formula (BCBS, 2005).  
1.3. Advanced IRB Approach 
1.3.1. Explanation on advanced IRB 
The IRB formula is designed to generate the minimum amount of capital that, in the minds of 
regulators, is necessary to cover the economic losses of the portfolio.  Banks cover their 
expected losses on an ongoing basis by provisions and write-offs. The unexpected loss, on the 
other hand, covers potential large losses additional to regular losses that occur in rare occasions. 
The capital required to cover unexpected loss is based on a statistical distribution of potential 
losses for a portfolio measured over a given period and within a specified confidence level. The 
IRB approach builds on 99.9% confidence level and a one-year horizon.  Unexpected loss is 
obtained by taking the difference between the mean loss and the potential loss represented by 
the confidence level of 99.9%.  
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Figure 1.3 IRB from a VaR perspective (BCBS, 2005) 
The Basel formula is centered on Vasicek model. The purpose of this model is to determine the 
expected loss and unexpected loss for a particular counterparty. Expected loss is equal to PD 
times LGD times EAD, whereas unexpected loss is estimated by determining the PD in a 
downturn situation. The model assumes that EAD and LGD are constant for an obligor at least 
within one year. Thus the down turn loss is calculated by multiplication of conditional PD, LGD 
and EAD. Unexpected loss is calculated by subtracting expected loss from loss during a 
downturn situation, which can be expressed as: 
ܷܮ ൌ ሺܲܦௗ௢௪௡௧௨௥௡ ൈ ܮܩܦ ൈ ܧܣܦሻ െ ሺܲܦ ൈ ܮܩܦ ൈ ܧܣܦሻ 
The formula for PD downturn could be derived from Vasicek model, it is a conditional 
probability of default under the assumption that the economy is in a bad state. It could be written 
as: 
ܰ ቊ
ܰିଵሺܲܦሻ ൅ √ߩ௩ ൈ ܰିଵሺݍሻ
ඥ1 െ ߩ௩
ቋ 
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Here N(A) denotes the standard normal distribution function with critical value of A and N-1(p) 
denotes the inverse function of N(A) with probability equal to p. 
The Basel II equation for the IRB capital charge for corporations, sovereigns and banks is given 
by 
ܭ ൌ ቐܮܩܦ ൈ ܰቌඨ
1
1 െ ߩ
ൈ ൣܰିଵሺܲܦሻ ൅ √ߩ ൈ ܰିଵሺ. 999ሻ൧ቍ െ ܲܦ ൈ ܮܩܦቑ ൈ ܵܨெ஺்௎ோூ்௒ 
Risk weighted assets is then calculated as 12.5 ൈ ܭ ൈ ܧܣܦ 
SFMATURITY is a scale factor to adjust for maturity effects, and this adjustment does not exist for 
retail portfolios. Later we will elaborate on the rationale for this adjustment. 
1.3.2. Implicit assumptions 
The foundation of IRB’s framework stems from Vasicek’s study on portfolio loss distribution, 
in which he showed that the loss distribution converges to an analytical form solution with 
increasing portfolio size to a limited type (Vasicek, 1991). Vasicek used a similar approach 
compared to Merton’s (1974) in modeling default behaviour from a firm value perspective.  
Gordy (2003) showed that the two important premises to apply Vasicek’s formula in Basel’s 
framework are single factor and granularity. Those two are crucial premises to insure a 
portfolio-invariant capital charges, i.e. the default characteristic of individual loan only depends 
on its own default parameters regardless of which portfolio it is placed in (Gordy, 2003). Such 
property of being portfolio-invariant is crucial in Basel’s internal rating based model since when 
violated, the comparability across different banks will be jeopardized.  
1. Single Factor: 
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One-factor risk model has been widely adopted in portfolio credit risk modeling. In the one-
factor framework, credit risks come from two sources only: systematic risks and idiosyncratic 
risks. It has the benefit of easy computation and more importantly, it can be used to derive a 
simple dependent structure with significant tractability. Additionally, the information may not 
always be available for multi-factors (Tasche and Emmer, 2005). 
One factor risk model is particularly appealing to imposition of a standardized capital charge 
framework since it provides an attainable dependent structure for the analytical solution of the 
proposed methodology of Basel IRB method. Explicitly or implicitly, the common factor in the 
model is referred to the economic condition. Yet commercial credit risk models such as 
CreditMetrics do not base on one-factor model assumption due to its rather weak theoretical 
justification (Credit Swiss First Boston). It is general agreed that a calibration of multiple-factor 
is not tractable in IRB’s framework (Gordy, 2003). Recently, efforts have been made in the 
multi-factor adjustment in analytical form solutions and Pykhtin (2004) developed a method to 
conduct such computation.  
2. Granularity 
The analytical solution under Basel’s IRB framework assumes that the portfolio under 
examination is asymptotic and fine-grained. Thus IRB is also known as the Asymptotic Single 
Risk Factor Model, i.e. ASRF model. A fine-grained portfolio requires every individual 
instrument account for an arbitrarily small share of the total exposure such that the idiosyncratic 
risks of individual instrument are diversified away. 
In reality however, portfolios rarely exhibit a perfectly fine granularity. It is common to observe 
some degrees of concentration on a particular obligor in the portfolio. Thus by applying the 
Basel IRB framework, it is generally agreed that the capital output is understated since the 
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idiosyncratic risks are not completely diversified (Gordy, 2003). The granularity assumption 
could be approximately valid for large institutions but less accurate with smaller and more 
specialized ones. The IRB approach due to its underpinning theory, completely omits the 
contribution of the possible undiversified idiosyncratic risks.  
Thus studies have been put forward in an attempt to quantify the necessary adjustment without 
losing too much tractability of the framework. The basic methodology and concept of 
granularity adjustment was introduced by Gordy in 2000 (Gordy, 2003) where he derived the 
simple adds-on charge for undiversified risk by analyzing the rate of convergence between 
coarse and fine-grained portfolios. The Basel Committee recognized and introduced the 
granularity adjustment formal based on Gordy’s study in 2001 (BCBS, 2001). However due to 
the complexity of this issue, granularity adjustment was shifted from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 in the 
following consultation paper. Then the method was refined by Wilde (2001b) as well as Martin 
and Wilde (2003). Tasche and Emmer (2005) summarized the above methods and improved the 
analytical form for the adjustment. Besides, they proposed an alternative method to tackle 
concentration risk called semi-asymptotic approach, which allows them to isolate the 
concentrated instrument and regard the rest of the portfolio fine-grained. Finally Gordy and 
Lutkebohmert in 2007 revised the granularity adjustment method and developed an 
approximation approach, which would reduce banks’ burden in data crunching and computation.  
3. Correlation 
In the IRB formula, a very important assumption is the level of the correlation parameter.  As 
the model employs only one systematic risk factor, the degree of the obligor’s exposure to the 
systematic risk factor is expressed by the asset correlation.  The asset correlations show how the 
asset value of one borrower depends on the asset value of another borrower.  This correlation 
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can also be described as the dependence of the asset value of a borrower on the general state of 
the economy as all borrowers are linked to each other by this single risk factor. 
Regulators have set predetermined values for the correlation parameter within each of the IRB 
formulas, which are segmented by asset class definitions specified under Basel II (corporate, 
commercial mortgages, residential mortgages, credit cards and consumer lending). The levels of 
the correlation parameters are the most important differentiator across the IRB formulas and a 
critical driver of the amount of Basel II capital generated across the different asset classes. So 
how well the correlation values have been calibrated by Basel regulators to reflect the risk 
profile and actual loss experience of credit portfolios is a deciding factor on the correctness of 
the Basel formula. 
Some studies on historical data prove that correlation calculated in Basel formula does not 
comply with empirically based correlation results.  Basel correlation assumptions are found to 
exceed the empirically derived correlation values across all asset classes(Hansen 2008). This 
conservatism would result in a higher regulatory capital reserve than using empirical correlation 
values. 
Also there is a theoretical assumption incorporated into the IRB correlations for certain asset 
classes, which is that asset correlations decrease as a function of PD.  The logic behind it is that 
the financial performance of weaker borrowers is assumed to be driven largely by idiosyncratic 
factors specific to the firm, so default risk depends less on the general state of the economy and 
thus correlation between assets would be lower. Basel II applies this assumption to corporate 
and commercial mortgage assets (correlation ranges from 24% to 12%) and consumer lending 
(correlation ranges from 16% to 3%).  Correlation is constant at 0.04 for qualifying revolving 
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exposures, and 0.15 for residential mortgage exposures. We take correlation for corporate assets 
as an example, which is defined as follows in Basel formula: 
ܥ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ ሺܴሻ
ൌ
0.12 ൈ ൫1 െ ݁ሺିହ଴ൈ௉஽ሻ൯
ሺ1 െ ݁ሺିହ଴ሻሻ
൘ ൅
0.24 ൈ ቀ1 െ ൫1 െ ݁ሺିହ଴ൈ௉஽ሻ൯ቁ
ሺ1 െ ݁ሺିହ଴ሻሻ
൘  
However, Fitch found out that there doesn’t appear to be a consistent relationship between PD 
and correlation values across asset classes (Hansen 2008). It found out that for consumer 
lending, empirical analysis of auto loans suggests a positive relationship between correlation and 
PD. So when this assumption does not hold, the IRB capital charge would lack accuracy. 
Basel II also assumes that correlations are static values describing the behaviour of dynamic 
assets whose future loss experience will change over time. The variability in loss rates could be 
impacted by financial product innovation, changes in key risk factors and structural shifts in 
financial markets, and the Basel II correlation values might be less relevant. 
4. Maturity Adjustment 
The Basel formula also incorporates an adjustment for maturity. This adjustment is in place due 
to the fact that long-term credits are riskier than short-term credits, as downgrades are more 
likely in case of long-term credits which require more capital. So this adjustment would be 
higher for longer term maturity loans. In the Basel formula, maturity adjustments are a function 
of not only maturity but also PD, and they are higher for low PD than for high PD borrowers, 
which could be explained intuitively that low PD borrowers have more potential for down-
grading. The formula for maturity adjustment could be written as: 
ܵܨ௠௔௧௨௥௜௧௬ ൌ
1 ൅ ሺ݉ െ 2.5ሻ ൈ ܾሺܲܦሻ
1 െ 1.5 ൈ ሺܲܦሻ
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ܾሺܲܦሻ ൌ   ൫0.11852 െ 0.05478 ൈ ln ሺܲܦሻ൯
ଶ
 
However, for very short maturities, maturity adjustment is found to be insufficient, this is a 
weakness in this formula. 
2. Methodology 
In this paper we intend to test the accuracy of risk capital computed under Basel’s IRB 
framework. In the previous section, we discussed the granularity assumption underpinning the 
internal rating model. Such assumption is essential to the model setup due to its contribution to 
tractability of the solution. Yet by making the granularity assumption, we are running the risk of 
underestimating the risk capital in portfolios not precisely fine-grained.  
To illustrate the potential estimation errors when assuming portfolio is fine-grained, we 
constructed a hypothetical portfolio and simulated its loss distribution (see appendix I for details 
of the portfolio). We used the distribution as a benchmark to compare with the results returned 
from Basel IRB formula.  We conducted the test in the following sequence and derived three 
propositions. 
1. We tested the granularity assumption by exploiting the fact that Basel IRB does not 
incorporate concentrations. We changed the composition of one PD band by combining 
many small loans into one concentrated loan. Thus we obtained a coarse-grained PD band 
without changing the total exposure and each band’s relative weight. IRB framework will 
not be able to detect such effect, which will be captured by simulations.  As a result, we 
computed the difference between two methods and verified the deficiency of IRB approach 
under fine-grained assumption. 
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2. We proceeded to test the marginal impact when we enlarged the portfolio with an additional 
loan. First we demonstrated how PD effect and concentration effect work separately, in 
influencing the true unexpected loss obtained from simulations. Then we went on to find out 
what the combined effect would be by assigning the additional loan to different PD grades, 
and also by varying its weight.  Through comparing IRB and simulated unexpected loss in 
each case, we could find out IRB’s reliability under each situation.  
 
3. Finally, we further explored one special case when we assigned the added loan to grade 1. 
The corresponding PD is less than 0.001, i.e. the degree of significance α. Similar to 
proposition 2, Basel IRB will not capture the concentration effect thus provide misleading 
information regarding the unexpected loss.  The accuracy of simulation method will be 
affected by the limitations of VaR approach since VaR only reflects the quantile loss and 
neglects the rest of the losses in the tail. In our example, the added loan is expected to 
default 12 times out of 20000 simulations. Coupled with the large potential loss of the added 
loan due to concentration, each time it defaults the corresponding portfolio loss is more 
likely to be in the worst scenario. Thus there is the chance that our 99.9% quantile loss will 
not include any of those 12 severe losses. We used similar framework in proposition 2 to 
investigate the simulation results. We proposed two solutions to this problem, by applying 
the Expected Shortfall approach or by increasing the degree of confidence. We computed the 
new risk measures under both approaches and compared the results with IRB and Simulated 
calculations.  
13 
 
2.1. Data and Model 
The data used are hypothetical corporate loan portfolios, and we used two base portfolios, one is 
a simplified portfolio with only one PD grade, the other is a more realistic one with 15 PD 
grades.  The base case parameters are specified in appendix A.  For all three propositions, 
portfolios used incorporate some modifications to the base cases. The inputs of the base case 
with 15 PD grades are similar to the ones used in the numerical example by Van Vuuren and 
Ramadurai (2007) trying to compare its basic model with Basel model, here we call it Fitch 
portfolio. 
The one-grade portfolio was constructed to simplify the illustration of some effects, so the 
parameters were set up to be as simple as possible. 
The Fitch portfolio in our paper is supposed to meet all Basel assumptions, so the Basel 
regulatory capital would be very close to the true unexpected loss, thus we can find out in each 
proposition how much difference would be purely caused by the change made to the base 
portfolio.  To meet the fine-grained assumption of Basel approach, the base portfolio was 
constructed to include 6000 loans with equal notional amount of one. And also fifteen PD 
grades were chosen so that the PD grade granularity was high, which would narrow the 
difference between Basel and true unexpected loss.  In order to simplify the data and comply 
with Basel, we assumed that the default probability of each loan is the average PD of the PD 
grade it belongs to. Meanwhile, the asset correlation was set up to be the same as those derived 
from IRB formula, which is a function of PD, so similarly, every loan in the same PD grade 
would have the same correlation. LGD here was set up to be the same as 36% of the exposure 
for every PD grade to simplify the calculation. Confidence level was kept at 99.9% following 
Basel’s approach. 
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We used two methods to calculate the capital charge, namely the IRB approach and Monte 
Carlo simulation. Under the IRB approach, we simply plugged three variables (PD, LGD, EAD), 
all specified in our portfolio inputs, into the IRB formula, and obtained the regulatory capital 
charge.   
Under Monte Carlo simulation, we set up a one-factor model to simulate the loss distribution, as 
IRB also uses a one-factor model. Once we have the loss distribution, the unexpected loss can 
be obtained easily by taking the difference between the 99.9% loss quantile and the mean loss.  
As the simulation method is intended to approximate the true unexpected loss in a real life 
situation, and to achieve a balance between efficiency and accuracy, we chose to run 20,000 
simulations for each scenario. However, we feel that even 20,000 simulations cannot guarantee 
us a reliable result, but more than that would be too time-consuming, so we set up a testing 
mechanism aimed to check the reliability of each run of simulation. We compared the actual 
number of defaults of each loan with its expected number of defaults calculated as its PD 
multiplied by number of simulations.  Only when simulation results of most of the loans stay 
close to the expected value, we would regard that run of simulation reliable.  
3. Results and Discussions 
3.1. Proposition 1: Basel IRB formula does not incorporate concentration risk 
We changed the composition of one PD grade by combining a certain number of unity loans into 
one concentrated loan. By doing so, we maintained the total EAD of the portfolio and the 
respective weight of each PD grade unchanged, but the number of loans in that PD grade is 
smaller. Then we compared the unexpected loss derived from simulation and Basel IRB. As 
long as the weight and EAD of each PD grade does not change, Basel IRB cannot distinguish a 
grade of many loans from another of fewer loans.  The following table demonstrates this point, 
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Table 3.1 Change the concentration of grade 8 
Relative weight  of new loan 
(percentage) 
Basel Capital (percentage of 
EAD) 
Simulated Unexpected Loss 
(percentage of EAD) 
0  0.0278  0.02845 
1  0.0278  0.0284 
2  0.0278  0.0286 
4  0.0278  0.0286 
6  0.0278  0.03295 
7.4  0.0278  0.0353 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Proposition 1 
The X-axis shows different levels of concentration as a percentage of the total EAD of the 
portfolio. The grade we selected to change is grade 8.  
We found that: 
1. As expected the Basel IRB does not incorporate such concentration effect and the risk 
cushion is unchanged at all levels of concentration. 
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2. The simulated losses dramatically deviate from IRB losses after the big loan takes on 
greater weight. 
 
3.2. Proposition 2: The marginal capital charge of adding a significantly large loan  
This is an extension of Proposition 1, which verified that IRB approach does not account for 
granularity effects. In this section, we demonstrated how much the true unexpected loss 
increased by adding a large loan, and compared it with the regulatory capital calculated under 
Basel II. Banks could use this weakness of IRB approach by adding large loans to their existing 
portfolios.  
Unexpected loss is the distance between the 99.9% VaR and the mean loss in our case, which is 
affected by the PD of the additional loan as well as its relative weight. If its PD is lower than the 
average PD of the existing portfolio, the new portfolio with the additional loan would shift the 
loss distribution to the left, so the mean would decrease, but the quantile would decrease more, 
this would shorten the distance between the mean and quantile, and vice versa. We call this 
change in unexpected loss affected by PD of the new loan PD effect. Figure 3.2.1 illustrates this 
effect when there is no concentration added.  At the same time, the addition of a large loan 
would result in fat tails in the loss distribution due to increase in correlation where losses tend to 
cluster. So VaR at the same significance level would increase, resulting in a bigger unexpected 
loss, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.2, we name it concentration effect. Both effects exist at the same 
time and when new loan’s PD is lower than average PD of existing portfolio, they move in 
different direction, resulting in uncertainty in the combined effect. 
17 
 
                    
                                               Figure 3.2.1 Pure PD effect 
 
18 
 
 
                                          Figure 3.2.2 Pure concentration effect 
Now we continue to provide statistical illustration of each effect separately. PD effect is well 
represented in Basel’s capital charge, but because of the fine-grained assumption in Basel, it 
doesn’t consider concentration effect. This is easily proven in table 3.2.2, where PD of the new 
loan is lower than the portfolio’s average PD, we can see that as concentration increases, Basel’ 
s capital charge decreases linearly.  Concentration effect can only be captured by simulation 
results, and to verify our theory on concentration effect, we constructed a fine-grained portfolio 
with one PD grade only, and added in a large loan with the same PD but different weights, and 
tried to compare the corresponding resulting unexpected losses from the simulation. Here PD 
effect doesn’t exist as PDs are the same for all the loans, so any change in unexpected loss is 
purely caused by the concentration effect. 
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The parameters of the original single grade portfolio are defined in appendix A. And the table 
below compares simulated unexpected loss with regulatory capital charge after a large loan is 
added to the original portfolio. 
Table 3.2.1 Results of pure concentration effect under single PD portfolio 
Relative weight (percentage) Basel Capital (percentage 
of EAD) 
Simulated Unexpected 
Loss (percentage of EAD) 
0 0.092738 0.0878 
2 0.092738 0.0867 
4 0.092738 0.0981 
6 0.092738 0.1039 
8 0.092738 0.1156 
10 0.092738 0.1481 
15 0.092738 0.1743 
20 0.092738 0.2146 
30 0.092738 0.3171 
 
 
Figure 3.2.3 Illustration of pure concentration effect 
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This result confirms our discussion before that Basel doesn’t incorporate concentration effect, 
which would increase the true unexpected loss demonstrated by simulations, and this effect 
grows as the level of concentration increases. 
Now that we understand how PD effect and concentration effect work independently, wetook 
another step by examining the combined effects. Theoretically, when the new loan has a higher 
PD than that of the original portfolio, both effects work in the same direction, which increase the 
unexpected loss. However, when the added loan has a lower PD, concentration effect and PD 
effect tend to offset each other, and it depends on the strength of each effect to decide the 
combined result. Figure 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 illustrate this point by looking at two cases, respectively 
when PD dominates or concentration dominates as the added loan has a lower PD. 
 
Figure 3.2.4 Illustration of combined effect (a)–low PD low concentration 
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Figure 3.2.5 Illustration of combined effect (b)‐low PD high concentration  
To illustrate this, we used the Fitch and added a loan of significantly larger exposure into one of 
the 15 grades.  The addition of such a loan increased the total EAD of the portfolio and the 
weight of the corresponding PD grade, thus impacted the portfolio PD. This resulted in a change 
in the regulatory capital charge calculated by the IRB formula, and we investigated the accuracy 
of this marginal capital by comparing it with the change of unexpected loss obtained from 
simulations.  In this situation, both PD effect and concentration effect come into play. 
The relative weight of the additional loan and its PD influenced the result significantly. To 
demonstrate this point, we assigned a range of different weights to the additional loan and 
placed it into a high PD grade first, and then into a low PD grade.  We chose a set of relative 
weights of the additional loan, and a low PD grade of 0.13% and a high PD grade of 0.98%. 
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And to ensure that the outcome is reliable, we ran each scenario for 20,000 simulations.  The 
result we obtained is as follows: 
Table 3.2.2 Add a loan to PD grade of 0.13% 
Relative weight (percentage) Basel Capital (percentage of 
EAD) 
Simulated Unexpected Loss 
(percentage of EAD) 
0 0.027841 0.0284 
1 0.027706 0.0248 
2 0.027514 0.0288 
3 0.027437 0.0288 
4 0.027302 0.0333 
6 0.027033 0.0281 
8 0.026763 0.0333 
10 0.026494 0.0397 
20 0.025147 0.0747 
30 0.0238 0.1083 
 
  
                                                    Figure 3.2.6 Combined effect under Fitch portfolio (a)‐Grade 2 
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We could observe that when PD of the additional loan is low, Basel capital charge decreases as 
the new loan takes on more weight, influenced by PD effect.  However, the simulation doesn’t 
have a clear pattern when concentration is below 6%. This is intuitively correct since PD effect 
and concentration effect tend to cancel out in this situation, but when concentration grows, 
concentration effect clearly dominates PD effect as the simulated unexpected loss increases 
dramatically. In this case, Basel II curve yields the misleading impression that a high exposure 
to the additional loan still improves the risk of portfolio, when in fact it is quite risky to have 
such a high concentration, which is captured by the simulation.   
In the case that PD of the additional loan is high at 0.98%, the result is as follows: 
Table 3.2.3 Add a loan to PD grade of 0.98% 
Relative weight (percentage) Basel Capital (percentage of 
EAD) 
Simulated Unexpected Loss 
(percentage of EAD) 
0 0.027841 0.0284 
1 0.028027 0.0289 
2 0.028214 0.0303 
4 0.028587 0.0326 
6 0.028773 0.0349 
8 0.029332 0.0409 
10 0.029705 0.0466 
15 0.030638 0.064 
20 0.03157 0.0797 
30 0.033434 0.1146 
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Figure 3.2.7 Combined effect under Fitch portfolio (b) – grade 15 
In this case, both PD effect and concentration effect move the loss quantile to the right, so 
unexpected loss would increase unambiguously. This is verified by the graph above, where both 
Basel and simulated capital charge increase as the additional loan takes on more weight. The 
difference could be explained as concentration effect. As a result, although more capital is 
required under IRB formula when there is more concentration, the marginal capital charge is 
still inadequate.  The difference becomes significant as the weight of the new loan goes beyond 
5%.  
To sum up, both two cases illustrated that marginal capital charge under Basel II is insufficient 
because of its inability to account for concentration effect, this would give banks incentives to 
add large loans in their portfolios, which contradicts Basel’s intention to pursue better risk 
management, by encouraging banks to take more risk. 
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3.3. Proposition 3: Marginal impact of adding an extremely low-risk loan will not be fully 
captured by any VaR approach. 
In this section, we examined the special case in proposition 2 when we assigned the special loan 
into grade 1 with PD of .0006. The result is not consistent with the proposition demonstrated 
previously. 
The PD in grade one is 0.06% and it is noteworthy that it is less than the significance level of 
the downturn condition. 
0.0006 ൏ 1 െ  0.999 ൌ 0.001 
As we proved in Proposition 2, Basel’s IRB framework does not incorporate concentration. 
Thus PD effect will be the only factor driving the shift of the loss distribution and causing the 
percentage risk cushion to decrease with increasing concentration.  The following graph shows 
that Basel capital charge declines linearly as new loan grows. 
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Figure 3.3.1 IRB under special case‐grade 1 
The simulation however showed inconsistent results compared to conclusions derived in 
Proposition 2.  In order to analyze this point in particular, again we used the one-band simplified 
portfolio mentioned before, and added in a loan with PD of 0.0006 and different weight. Based 
on the simulation results, we have the following unexpected loss as a percentage of EAD. 
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Figure 3.3.2 Illustration of special case under single band portfolio 
Since PD of new loan was set to be extremely small, as we derived in proposition 2, the entire 
distribution will shift to the less risky side and cause the quantile to decrease as well. However, 
the concentration effect illustrated earlier does not dominate the PD effect even with 35% 
concentration.  
One possible explanation deals with the deficiency of the quantile measurement. VaR approach 
simply ignores the losses beyond the quantile. However if the PD is smaller than α, the 
increasing tail density gained from concentration effect will not have as much impact as in 
proposition 2.  
We proposed two ways to account for the deficiency of VaR by either employing another risk 
measurement or increasing the degree of confidence.  
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3.3.1. Expected Shortfall (ES) 
Tasche (2001) demonstrated that ES better describes the expected loss conditional on the worst 
scenario occurring than VaR. We computed ES to compare with Basel’s and simulated VaR 
approach.  
In this test, we carefully examined the simulated results to make sure that the controlled loan 
defaults certain times within 20000 simulations such that it complies with Basel’s assumption. 
In short we ensured the loss at the 0 .1% quantile, the minimum loss of the worst scenario, does 
not include a loss in the controlled loan. The following graph compares two VaR approaches 
with expected shortfall when a significantly large loan is added to grade 1. 
 
Figure 3.3.3 VaR and ES 
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Table 3.3.1 Results of UL under three approaches 
PD grade 1  Basel  Simulation ES minus 
mean loss 
def time of 
new loan 
0  0.027841  0.0282  0.0358  0 
1  0.027645  0.0291  0.0426  8.5 
2  0.027449  0.0274  0.0391  11 
4  0.027056  0.0284  0.037  14 
6  0.026664  0.0267  0.0365  11 
8  0.026272  0.0306  0.0381  15 
10  0.02588  0.0357  0.044  14 
15  0.024899  0.034  0.0569  15 
20  0.023919  0.02673  0.057046  10 
25  0.022938  0.0205  0.0677  11 
30  0.021958  0.0233  0.0881  12 
35  0.020977  0.0255  0.0967  14 
 
We included the default time to show that across all cases in our simulation, the concentrated 
loan does not default more than 20 times, which is derived from .1% of 20000 simulations.  
We can see from the graph that the two VaR approaches all demonstrated that the by adding 
such a portfolio we can enjoy some level of risk reduction. This is intuitively incorrect since 
such a loan with concentration would add more risk, captured by the ES measurements. 
3.3.2. Confidence Level 
Another way to bypass this obstacle is to change the level of significance such that the new 
threshold is lower than the PD of the concentrated loan. In our case, we can choose any number 
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lower than 0.94%=1- 0.06%. Basel will automatically assume such loan to default, which leaves 
the only remaining concern to be concentration impact. Thus when the level of significance is 
set lower than 0.94%, the situation is identical to the case illustrated above with concentrated 
loan is placed into PD grade 2, as the PD of grade 2 is 0.13% which is higher than 1-
99.9%=0.1%. The following table compares two VaR approaches with expected shortfall when 
a large loan is added to PD grade 2. 
Table 3.3.2 Results of UL after changing alpha 
concentration weight  Basel  Simulation ES  ES‐SimVaR 
0  0.027841 0.0284  0.0358  0.0074 
1  0.027706 0.0274  0.0378  0.0104 
2  0.027514 0.0284  0.0404  0.012 
4  0.027302 0.0333  0.0409  0.0076 
6  0.027033 0.0281  0.0347  0.0066 
8  0.026763 0.0333  0.0405  0.0072 
10  0.026494 0.0397  0.0458  0.0061 
20  0.025147 0.0747  0.0798  0.0051 
30  0.0238  0.1083  0.1134  0.0051 
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                                            Figure 3.3.4 Changing the significance level 
We can easily tell that the difference between ES and Simulated VaR would not widen as 
concentration increases, as seen in the previous case.  So in this situation VaR is a reliable risk 
measure as it captures the loss of the big loan. This is equally valid when we decrease the level 
of significance in case that the large loan’s PD is too low.  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we focused on the deficiency of Basel IRB due to its granularity assumption. We 
constructed a scenario violating such assumption and quantified the potential calculation error 
by comparing IRB’s results to our simulated unexpected losses. We found that such difference 
could be substantial given that the concentration is moderately high, which is consistent with 
empirical studies (Tasche and Emmer, 2005).  
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Therefore banking practitioners and industrial supervisors should be aware of such flaw. Banks 
with medium or small portfolio size acquiring additional loans could run into the risk of 
misunderstanding the marginal risk contribution of the loan by computing the risk capital under 
IRB’s framework. 
Moreover, the VaR approach underpinning the IRB model has its own limitations in providing 
accurate information of portfolio loss under distressed situation. We have proven in proposition 
3 that when a significantly low-risk loan is added to the portfolio, the percentage risk capital 
computed under VaR measurement will decrease regardless of the level of concentration. This 
could generate unintended incentives for banks to load up risky loans and balance the added risk 
by acquiring a highly concentrated low-risk loan. Under such case, the risk cushion computed 
will be far from sufficient to cover the potential loss if occurred. Supervisors should be alarmed 
of such new types of “regulatory arbitrage” in the era of Basel II. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Base Portfolio Parameters  
  Fitch Portfolio  One‐grade Portfolio 
Asset Category  Corporate loans Corporate loans 
Number of loans  6000  6000 
Notional amount of each loan  1  1 
PD  Defined below  0.5% 
LGD  0.36  1 
Maturity   1  1 
PD Grades  15  1 
Confidence level  99.9%  99.9% 
Correlation  Calculated as Basel’s formula  Calculated as Basel’s formula 
 
PD Bands & Exposure for Fitch Portfolio 
PD band  PD (%)  % of total exposure 
1  0.06  4.6 
2  0.13  5.7 
3  0.15  6.1 
4  0.18  10.2 
5  0.2  10.9 
6  0.23  10.7 
7  0.44 9.5
8  0.49  7.4 
9  0.54  7.3 
10  0.63  6.7 
11  0.68  5.6 
12  0.84  4.9 
13  0.89  4.7 
14  0.95  3.9 
15  0.98 1.8
 
 
